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What are natural kinds? Are mental disorders natural kinds? Why does it matter? Let’s start 
with rough and ready answers, and then assess complications later.  
 
Paradigmatically, natural kinds are the kinds of thing or stuff that are classified by the natural 
sciences.  The Periodic Table provides perhaps the best example of the potential importance 
of natural kinds for science. The Periodic Table provides a classificatory basis for chemistry 
that enables different types of stuff to be classified, and via this classification, for them to be 
understood and controlled. Thus, once I have determined that a particular chemical sample 
is lead, say, I know how it will behave and how to treat it if I wish to use it in various ways. 
Classification grounds explanations and predictions, and enables us to control a domain. If 
mental disorders are natural kinds, perhaps we can hope that one day psychiatric 
classification will ground psychiatric theory and practice in a way that approaches the 
successes of the Periodic Table in grounding chemistry.  
 
In the philosophy of psychiatry, debates over whether mental disorders can be natural kinds 
emerge because kinds of mental disorder are manifestly different from chemical kinds in 
various ways. While chemical kinds are precise, psychiatric kinds are fuzzy. While chemical 
kinds are objective, the identification of psychiatric kinds is value-laden.  Psychiatric 
classification involves classifying people, and unlike chemical elements, those people can 
respond to being classified in various ways. Later in this chapter I will go through these 





Thus we have our rough and ready answers: natural kinds are kinds picked out by the 
sciences. Identifying natural kinds is worthwhile because such kinds can ground 
explanations and predictions and enable us to gain control over a domain. Although kinds of 
mental disorder differ from the kinds recognised by sciences such as chemistry in various 
ways, they may yet be natural kinds (though this will not be shown until later in this chapter). 
Now for the complications: 
 
1. What are natural kinds? Three traditions distinguished. 
  
In this chapter we will focus on natural kinds understood as the kinds that are picked out by 
scientific classifications. However, the literature on natural kinds can be hard to navigate as 
different authors mean different things when they talk of natural kinds and are interested in 
different sorts of problem. Other authors have also noted the heterogeneity of natural kind 
concepts and suggested various classifications (Haslam 2002a; Murphy 2006; Zachar 
forthcoming). I suggest that we can usefully divide the literature into three traditions:  
 
First, and I think most importantly for the philosophy of psychiatry, there is the tradition on 
which we will focus, call it the kinds-in-science tradition (e.g. Dupré 1993, 2001, 2006). This 
tradition is impressed by the power of classification in science and is interested in those 
kinds that facilitate such successful classifications. Paradigmatic examples of natural kinds 
are taken to be chemical kinds and biological species. When writers in this tradition seek to 
understand natural kinds they seek to understand kinds like these, and how they can be 
employed in scientific practice. 
 
Second, there is an Aristotelian tradition. In the Aristotelian tradition, talk of natural kinds is 
taken to be of importance not only for explaining the behaviour of members of a kind (as in 
the kinds-in-science tradition) but also for making sense of problems concerned with identity, 
development, and change (Brody 1973;  Ayers 1981; Megone 1998).   For Aristotelians, the 
character of an individual depends on what kind of thing it is, and the ways in which 
individuals can change while yet retaining their identity thus depends on the natural kind to 
which they belong. Thus a caterpillar changing into a butterfly continues to be the same 
individual, because such changes are part of the natural development of individuals of that 
type, while a caterpillar that is eaten by a bird ceases to be. Aristotelians take biological 
kinds to be key examples of natural kinds. Within the philosophy of psychiatry, Chris Megone 
employs Aristotelian traditions of natural kinds in making sense of mental disorder (1998, 
2000). Megone argues that humans are essentially rational animals and that mental 
disorders can be understood as states that inhibit human flourishing. Aristotelian approaches 
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might also be used to make sense of some of the problems that mental disorders can raise 
for questions relating to the identity of persons. In some dissociative conditions, for example, 
we may wonder whether identity is destroyed or fragments. In so far as the Aristotelian 
tradition makes use of natural kind talk in understanding the development and destruction of 
individuals it might prove useful for exploring such issues. To date, and as far as I am aware, 
however, such work has yet to be undertaken. 
 
Third amongst our traditions of natural kinds, there are New Essentialists (e.g. Ellis 2001, 
2002). New Essentialists are principally interested in essences. An “essence” or “essential 
property” is a property that all members of a kind share that determines their nature. In the 
case of chemical elements, for example, the essence would plausibly be the atomic number. 
While Aristotelians also talk of essences they can be distinguished from New Essentialists as 
their very different metaphysical stance leads them to nominate very different candidates for 
“essences”. Aristotelians will suggest that “being a rational animal” might be the essential 
property of humans. New Essentialists think of essences as being the properties 
fundamental physics and chemistry find explanatory. New Essentialists have principally been 
interested in the metaphysical implications of a kind having such an essential property; for 
example, some have argued that natural laws are necessary. They have restricted their 
interest to those kinds, such as fundamental particles and chemical elements, that plausibly 
do have essences in their sense. In so far as other kinds, such as biological species, fail to 
have such essences, thinkers working in this tradition simply lose interest in them. This 
tradition is of the least interest for the philosophy of psychiatry as it is highly unlikely that 
kinds of mental disorder will have essential properties in the same sort of way as chemical 
elements.  
 
These three traditions use the term “natural kind” slightly differently and are concerned with 
slightly different issues. Within the philosophy of psychiatry, confusions between them have 
resulted in much misunderstanding. Misunderstanding  between those adopting a kinds-in-
science approach (according to which natural kinds may or may not have essences) and 
essentialist approaches (on which natural kinds must have essences by definition) has 
resulted in much discussion failing to get beyond the stage where one author takes the 
plausible absence of essences to show that mental disorders cannot be natural kinds (e.g. 
Zachar 2000; Haslam 2002b), while another argues that mental disorders can be considered 
natural kinds on some non-essentialist account of natural kinds (e.g. Cooper 2005). In order 
to avoid such misunderstandings, when talking about kinds it is best to be explicit about what 





Returning to the kinds-in-science tradition - How does identifying natural kinds play a 
role in science? 
 
How does identifying natural kinds play a role in science? If we limit ourselves to thinking 
about kinds such as the chemical elements, the answer to this question may at first seem 
clear. Why is it we can expect all samples of some element to behave similarly? Because, all 
samples of an element share an “essential property”; they all have the same atomic number, 
and this ensures that they will have the same chemical properties. In theoretically important 
respects, all samples of a particular element are interchangeable.  
 
Turn to biological species, however, and we will soon see that thinking in terms of essential 
properties will not quite do. Classifying biological individuals into different species has 
proved highly successful as a classificatory strategy; members of a species can be expected 
to behave in similar ways. However, plausibly it is not the case that all members of a species 
share some essential property. Within a species, diversity is the rule at both the genetic and 
phenotypic level. As John Dupré (1981,1993) has powerfully argued there are simply no 
essential properties to be found.1 
 
Within the kinds-in-science tradition on which we are focussing, several accounts of kinds 
have been developed with the aim of explaining how it is that kinds like biological species 
can successfully ground explanations and inductive inferences even though members of the 
species do not share some essential property. In so far as any kinds of mental disorder 
might be expected to be rather like other biological kinds these accounts are of particular 
interest for the philosophy of psychiatry.   
 
John Dupré has offered an account that he calls promiscuous realism (1981, 1993). He asks 
us to consider the entities of some domain mapped into a multidimensional space where the 
                                                            
1  Dupré argues that there are no necessary and sufficient criteria for species membership. It will not do 
to say that members of a species can interbreed. Not only is such a criterion inapplicable to asexual 
species, but it also runs into problems dealing with sterile organisms, hybrid organisms etc. It will not 
do to rely on criteria of ancestry.  While it is true that rabbits have rabbit ancestors and hares have 
hare ancestors, this is not enough to distinguish rabbits from hares, as some other criterion will be 
required to distinguish the ancestor rabbits from the ancestor hares. Nor can measures of genetic or  
phenotypic similarity be used to pick out co-members of a species. Some species are more 




different dimensions map onto different properties (as in cluster analysis). Entities that are 
similar to each other will form clusters in such a space. Dupré suggests that kinds such as 
biological species can be identified with some such clusters. Of course, in the 
multidimensional space, not only biological species, but also multitudes of other clusters may 
be identified – some will correspond to classifications at levels higher or lower than species, 
for example, families, and varieties, will also be identifiable. The key claim for Dupré is that 
the world is such that some individuals are objectively similar to each other.2 They share 
similar properties and will thus behave alike. In my 2005 Classifying Madness I argue that a 
Dupré-style account can fruitfully be applied to kinds of mental disorder. 
 
In another cluster-type account, Richard Boyd has argued that we might usefully think of 
biological species as being “homeostatic property clusters” (1988, 1991). Like Dupré, Boyd 
argues that members of a species share a cluster of properties, but in addition Boyd 
emphasises that this is for a reason. Homeostatic mechanisms ensure that members of the 
kind will continue to be alike – in the case of biological species these mechanisms include 
gene-flow between members of the species, and environmental pressures that mean that 
those organisms which survive must all be capable of surviving in the same environmental 
niche. The difference between Dupré's account and Boyd's is that Boyd requires 
homeostatic mechanisms to “glue together” a property cluster, whereas Dupré requires no 
glue. In the philosophy of psychiatry, Dominic Murphy suggests that Boyd’s account of 
natural kinds might accommodate certain mental disorders (Murphy, 2006, pp.338-341). 
 
A further account of biological kinds has been produced by Ruth Millikan (1999). She 
emphasises the role of copying mechanisms that make it the case that biological kinds are 
fundamentally historical kinds, with the similarity of organisms of a species ensured by the 
fact that copying mechanisms make offspring like their parents. Turning to mental disorders, 
                                                            
2
 The claim that some pairs of entities are objectively more similar to each other than other pairs is 
common to all accounts of natural kinds. To illustrate, two twin tigers would be said to be more similar 
to each other than some other pairs of entities, for example a tiger and a balloon. Such similarities are 
seen as objective features of the world. The tiger twins share more properties than do the tiger and 
the balloon. Such claims are compatible with many metaphysical accounts of properties, but not with 
all of them. In particular, there are certain nominalist positions on which the idea that some pairs of 
entities are more similar than others makes no sense (for example, Goodman 1972). Discussing the 
details of the various accounts of properties is far beyond the scope of this chapter. Interested 






copying mechanisms may also play a role in explaining why cases of a kind are alike. Ian 
Hacking has developed a number of case studies of epidemic mental disorders where 
unconscious copying mechanisms result in similar cases occurring (Hacking 1995a, 2010).  
Marion Godman (2011) is currently developing the idea that certain kinds of mental disorder 
can best be understood as historical kinds.   
 
Plausibly different accounts might work best for different mental disorders. Millikan-style 
copying, for example, will clearly have a greater role to play in some mental disorders than 
others. There is still work to be done figuring out exactly which account of kinds will work 
best for which kinds of mental disorder.  
 
 
2. Reasons why natural kinds of mental disorder might seem problematic 
 
A number of writers have suggested that kinds of mental disorder cannot be natural kinds. In 





It is frequently assumed that natural kinds should be discrete – that is, when the members of 
any two natural kinds are plotted in a multidimensional space, there should be a gap 
between them (Mill, 1973, p.123; DeSousa, 1984, p.565; Haslam 2002b; Reznek, 1987, 
p.42; Samuels 2009). I suggest, however, that gaps, where they occur, are not important. 
The important thing about natural kinds is that members of a natural kind are all objectively 
similar to each other. The basic idea is that the causal structure of the world is such that 
certain entities are to a large extent interchangeable, in the sense that their similar properties 
mean that they can be expected to behave in much the same fashion. Thus, once I have 
learnt how to grow one radish seed, I will be able to grow any radish seed, because they 
really are all much the same – the similar causal natures of the seeds mean that they will 
need the same sorts of environmental conditions to flourish.  When it comes to grounding 
predictions and explanations and enabling us to control the world, it's the similarities 
between members of a kind that do all the work. Some kinds are gappy (e.g. chemical 
elements, as atomic numbers only come in integer numbers) and some kinds vary along 
dimensions (e.g. alloys), but this difference doesn't much matter. Alloys provide nice 
examples of continuously varying kinds that can yet ground explanations and predictions. If I 
know the make-up of a sample of alloy I can predict its properties just as accurately as if I 
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know the identity of a sample of pure metal. For this reason I suggest that we should 
consider kinds that vary along dimensions to also be natural kinds. Given that such 
dimensional kinds can do all the important work of traditional discrete natural kinds there is 
no benefit in restricting the term “natural kind” to discrete kinds. 
 
Turning to consider mental disorders, discussion by those who argue that mental disorders 
might in some cases be better represented by a dimensional, as opposed to a categorical, 
classification system has revolved around two sorts of case. First, there are cases where 
one type of disorder seems to merge into another – thus for example, depressive disorders 
might run into anxiety disorders. Second, there are cases where a disorder fades into the 
normal range. Once again depression provides an example, as there seems to be no natural 
dividing line between normal unhappiness and mild depression. In both cases, I suggest, 
that the really important question is whether cases that are classified together genuinely 
share properties. Whether there are any sharp boundaries that can be drawn between the 




On many accounts, a condition is only a disorder if it is a bad thing (Flew 1973; Fulford 1989; 
Reznek 1987; Wakefield 1992; Cooper 2002). Given that disorders are defined partly in 
value terms, but that natural kinds need to be defined with regard to natural properties, it 
may thus look like types of disorder cannot be natural kinds (as an example of someone who 
takes this line of argument see Peter Zachar (2000b.)). 
 
We can respond to this worry by thinking through an analogy.  Weeds are unwanted plants, 
and so whether a particular plant is considered a weed or a flower can vary with the tastes of 
the gardener. The umbrella category “weed” is defined in terms of values and is not a natural 
kind. However the different species of weed, such as dandelion and dock, are still natural 
kinds. Although whether a particular plant counts as a weed depends on values, the fact that 
it is a dandelion, or a dock, depends solely on its natural properties. Similarly, while the 
category “mental disorder” is value-laden and does not form a natural kind, conditions that 
are commonly disorders – schizophrenia, depression, and so on – may still be natural kinds. 
To complete the analogy, let's imagine that some particular process underpins cases of 
schizophrenia. Let's suppose that such a process occurs within some individual, but in that 
person the process does no harm – they hear voices but are not harmed by their condition. 
In such a case, I suggest we could say that the individual has schizophrenia, but not a 
disorder.  While schizophrenia is frequently a kind of disorder, in cases where it does no 
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harm, it might simply be considered a kind of difference. In the same way, while dandelions 
are generally weeds, the dandelions in my wild flower garden are not weeds, though they 
are still dandelions. I conclude that types of condition that are usually mental disorders might 
be natural kinds even though the umbrella category “disorder” is not a natural kind.  
 
My reasoning here would imply that someone could have schizophrenia and yet not be 
mentally ill. Some would take terms such as “schizophrenia” to themselves be value-laden 
and would say that someone biologically and psychologically of the “schizophrenic-type”, but 
who is not harmed by their condition does not have schizophrenia. I suspect that current 
concepts of “schizophrenia” are insufficiently defined for it to be clear whether the term is 
itself value-laden, or whether it is a purely descriptive term that falls under a value-laden 
umbrella category (as the “weed” analogy would suggest). Building on work by Joseph 
Laporte (2004), I think it likely that the extension of such terms will become more precise in 
the future as the relevant linguistic communities reach a consensus on how such terms 
should be used.  
 
In his book Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change (2004), Laporte uses case studies to 
examine controversies that have emerged in the history of science because the extension of 
terms is sometimes not as precise as emerging circumstances require. For example, he 
considers how the scientific community reacted to the discovery that samples of jade fall into 
two chemically distinct kinds. Laporte argues that prior to the discovery it was indeterminate 
whether “jade” referred to all samples of a particular chemical structure or to all samples with 
particular superficial characteristics. Following the discovery that samples of “jade” fall into 
two chemical varieties it was necessary for the fuzziness of the extension to be clarified and 
it was eventually decided that “jade” would apply to both varieties. 
 
I suggest that the discovery that some voice-hearers are not harmed by their condition 
brings out indeterminacies in the extension of “schizophrenia” in a way analogous to that in 
which the chemical discoveries brought out indeterminacies in the extension of “jade”.  
Whether one should think of terms like “schizophrenia” as value-laden or, as the weed 
analogy suggests, as a purely descriptive term that falls under a value-laden umbrella term 
will ultimately be a matter for decision by the relevant linguistic communities (primarily 
mental health professionals, researchers, and service users). The factors to be weighed in 
making such a decision will be complex. Still, the weed analogy shows that it would be 
possible to precisify terms like “schizophrenia” and “depression” in such a way that they 





On Cultural Shaping 
 
The “natural” in “natural kind” should be read as in “natural law” as opposed to “present in 
the garden of Eden”. Some natural kinds are manmade; plutonium is an example. Still, there 
might be thought to be something problematic about the extent to which kinds of mental 
disorder are shaped by culture.  Plausibly, mental disorders have varied greatly across 
cultures and history. This may lead one to doubt that natural kinds of disorder can be picked 
out. Maybe the disorders that are found in one context are simply different to those that are 
found in another? Depending on the sorts of cultural shaping that occur, different responses 
to this worry are appropriate. 
 
Superficial variation 
As an example of superficial variation consider how the content of delusions varies with time 
and place. In Europe, in the early modern period, there were people who believed 
themselves to be made of glass or earthenware (Speak 1990). Nowadays deluded people 
have different fears. Such variation is easy to understand. It's commonly the case that the 
superficial properties of members of natural kinds vary with environmental conditions. For 
example, apple trees can be grown tall or flat against walls depending on how they are 
pruned. Variation at a superficial level is fully compatible with types of mental disorder being 
natural kinds.  
 
Deeper cultural moulding 
 
More profound types of cultural moulding may also occur. In  Creating Mental Illness (2002) 
Allan Horwitz makes a convincing case that “most nonpsychotic symptoms stem from 
general underlying vulnerabilities that may assume many different overt forms, depending on 
the cultural context in which they arise...Cultural processes, not the unfolding of natural 
disease, structure the overt manifestation of symptoms into recognizable entities” (p.108). 
Horwitz argues that whether a vulnerable and distressed person manifests a disorder 
characterised by depression, or anxiety, or somatization, or some other symptom, depends 
on their cultural context. If Horwitz is right, then not only “superficial” properties shift with 
cultural setting. 
 
In thinking through such cases of “deep moulding”, considering some of the kinds that occur 
in other natural historical sciences can be illuminating. Specifically, Iet us consider the 
different sorts of igneous rocks that are recognised by geologists. These rocks are all formed 
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from magma. All the different igneous rocks are made from the same basic stuff, but their 
characteristics vary depending on the conditions under which they were formed. The size of 
the crystals in the rock depends on the rate of cooling for example. Igneous rocks are 
classified according to their chemical composition and their history (both of which can vary 
continuously). Classifications of rock are complex. Still, the different kinds of rock can be 
considered natural kinds. Samples of a kind of rock are objectively similar to each other and 
distinguishing rock kinds is useful for grounding explanations and inductive inferences.  
 
If Horwitz is right and different anxiety-depression type disorders are formed into distinct 
entities by cultural context, then we can think of such disorders as being kinds analogous to 
the different kinds of rock distinguished by geologists. Admittedly such historical natural 
kinds may only occur under certain conditions (in Mad Travelers (1998) Ian Hacking shows 
this is the case for fugue, for example). Still, though such disorders may occur for a limited 
time or in limited places, within those constraints the kinds operate like normal natural kinds. 
Historical natural kinds – such as kinds of rock, and culturally formed type of mental disorder, 
can usefully be considered natural kinds, I suggest, because the kinds can support 
explanations and inductive inferences and feature in law-like generalisations. The individuals 
that fall into such kinds are “repeatables” in the sense that any two specimens of basalt, or 
any two cases of fugue, can be expected to have much in common.  
 
At this point some may worry that in suggesting that even some culturally formed mental 
disorders can be considered natural kinds, I have come a very long way from what many 
have meant when they talk of natural kinds. My kinds need not have essential properties, 
can vary along continua, and can be historically contingent, in that they may only arise under 
certain historical conditions. The reason I think it's reasonable to call such kinds natural 
kinds, is that they are up to the job of grounding explanations and predictions. To take an 
example, anorexia may plausibly be a culturally formed mental disorder, and yet is the sort of 
kind that can help ground psychiatric science. We can know that anorexia is hard to treat, 




Over the last few decades, Ian Hacking's work has stressed the importance of the fact that 
humans respond to being classified in ways that other classified entities do not (1986, 1988, 
1992, 1995a, 1995b). A child who is told they are stupid may stop trying at school and fall 
behind yet further; a diagnosis of “problem drinking” may come to motivate abstinence; a 
whole class of people may respond to a classification with new forms of resistance, as in “fat 
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pride”. Such interactions between classifications and behaviour mean that “human kinds” -  
the kinds classified by the human sciences – become moving targets. No sooner has a kind 
been picked out than behaviours shift and classifications have to be revised. 
 
One of Hacking's best developed examples of such “looping effects” concerns Multiple 
Personality Disorder (1995a). When cases of Multiple Personality Disorder were first 
reported, a multiple would typically possess just two or three clearly distinct personalities. 
Over time, however, the symptoms of multiples shifted. Hacking makes a convincing case 
that the shift in symptoms was in part caused by changing prototypes of the disorder being 
made available in the media. The media tended to report more florid cases, and over time 
multiples started to present with more and more personalities, and as their numbers 
increased, these personalities became more diverse and also more fragmentary. Note that 
Hacking's claim is not that patients intentionally copy the symptoms of publicised cases. 
Rather the mechanism is more subtle and subconscious, but still the consequence is that a 
distressed individual will most likely manifest distress in ways that are culturally recognised. 
 
At certain points in his work, Hacking has claimed that interaction between kinds and their 
classification, as seen in the case of Multiple Personality Disorder, marks an important 
distinction between natural kinds and human kinds, such that human kinds cannot be natural 
kinds. Previously, I have argued that Hacking is wrong on this point (Cooper 2004). The gist 
of my argument is this: It is true, as Hacking, has claimed, that human kinds shift in response 
to classificatory practices, and this requires classifications to be updated. However, this is 
not sufficient to show that human kinds cannot be natural kinds. Other types of natural kind 
also shift in response to pressures that only affect kinds of their particular type. For example, 
types of domestic animal and plant shift as a result of selective breeding and only types of 
domestic animal and plant can be selectively bred (Boyd 1991). It is of course important to 
note that particular types of kind are vulnerable to shifting under different types of pressures, 
but there is no reason to think that these differences mark any fundamental metaphysical 
distinctions.  
 
Hacking also proposed a supplementary argument, which used Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim 
that intentional actions are intentional under a description to argue that the new descriptions 
formulated by the human sciences made new types of action logically possible (Hacking 
1986, 1995a, Anscombe 1957). I have argued that this argument is based on a 
misinterpretation of Anscombe’s work (Cooper 2004). Her claim that intentional actions are 
only intentional under-a-description should be interpreted as being equivalent to the claim 
that an intentional actions is only intentional qua some aspect (an example she gives is one 
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where a bird intends to land on the twig qua a way to get the seed, but not qua a way to land 
in the bird trap) (Anscombe 1971). This translation of Anscombe’s claim makes it clear that 
formulating new descriptions does not make new actions logically possible. 
 
In his most recent work, Hacking has himself shifted away from talking of natural and human 
kinds on the basis that talk of “natural kinds” has become so laden with metaphysical 
baggage that the term in now best avoided (2007). This is a claim with which I am 
sympathetic, although the approach suggested in this chapter is that rather than jettisoning 
the terminology one should be explicit about what one has in mind when talking about 
natural kinds. 
   
Functionally Defined Kinds 
 
A number of writers have argued that psychological kinds cannot be natural kinds because 
they are functionally defined (McGinn 1991). Functionalists about the mind claim that mental 
states are characterised by their causal role. That is, the nature of a mental state is fixed by 
the types of stimuli that typically produce it, its causal relations with other mental states, and 
the types of behaviour that it typically produces. Thus, for example, fear is a state that is 
characteristically produced by stimuli like charging bulls, snarling dogs and aggressive gun 
men, interacts with other mental states, such as the belief that help can be summoned, and 
leads to behaviour like screaming for help and running away. Functionalism implies that 
mental states can be multiply realised. Any state that fits the right causal role counts as a 
mental state, no matter what its physical realisation. Thus, while my fear of dogs is realised 
by some neural state, your fear might be realised by some quite different brain state, and a 
robot’s fear would be realised by electronics. Given that cases of the same psychological 
kind (e.g. fears) can be physically unalike, these kinds look very unlike prototypical natural 
kinds, where the similar behaviour of members of the kind occurs because the members are 
physically similar. 
 
This problem can be dealt with in at least two ways. First, and most simply, we can note that 
the claim that mental states are theoretically multiply realisable is compatible with all human 
mental states being realised in much the same way (Kim 1993, pp.305-335).  In robots and 
martians fears may be realised by all sorts of different systems, but in humans all fears may 
be linked to some particular anatomy. This means that human psychological states of a kind 




Second, we can note that even when the kinds of some domain are functionally defined 
when they are working properly, the kinds of breakdown that occur need not be functionally 
defined. Consider electronic components for example. These are functionally defined – 
anything that behaves like a capacitor is a capacitor, and capacitors can be made of different 
materials. Still, the ways in which capacitors can break down depend on the physical stuff 
that different types of capacitor are made of; for instance some are brittle while others are 
not. In so far as we might think of mental disorders as arising when normal mental 
functioning breaks down it is consistent to think that, even if normal mental states are 
functionally defined, abnormal ones might not be. For example, I might be a functionalist 
about normal beliefs and desires, and yet also think that human mental states are vulnerable 
to certain types of disruption that are characteristically caused by drinking too much alcohol. 
In the same sort of way that only brittle capacitors are vulnerable to breaking by smashing, 
only thinkers with a certain biology will be vulnerable to certain sorts of mental disruption. 
Being a functionalist about normal mental states is thus compatible with thinking that kinds of 
mental disorder may be natural kinds.  
 
Admittedly, being a functionalist about normal mental states is also compatible with thinking 
that mental disorders are functionally-defined. In order to motivate this position, though, 
some further reason for thinking that mental disorders are functionally-defined would need to 
be provided. David Papineau (1994) presents an argument for thinking that any disorders 
that can be characterised as stemming from dysfunctional patterns of learnt behaviour and 
thinking will be functionally defined. However, the scope of Papineau’s argument is limited, 
as many mental disorders cannot plausibly be seen to have their origins in faulty learning.   
 
 
3. On finding natural kinds of mental disorder 
 
When seeking natural kinds the aim is to find categories that map the causal structure of the 
domain being classified.  How might natural kinds of disorder best be identified? The 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification has fallen from 
favour in recent philosophy of science, but appealing to something like it is here useful. The 
basic thought is as follows: The key task is to group cases together in such a way that co-
members of a category really are importantly similar to each other. Co-members of a 
category should share properties that mean they can be expected to behave in similar ways. 
Depending on one’s account of kinds, one might also require that these similarities can be 
explained by the existence of homeostatic mechanisms or via copying.  How such a 




Within current psychiatry, research traditions seek to construct classifications in various 
ways. Most dominant is the approach associated with the DSM, but there are also competing 
traditions that propose that classifications might be developed using the methods of 
numerical taxonomy, or propose radical overhauls to classification on the basis of some 
theory or other.  
 
Though they may not describe their aim in these terms, I take it that research programmes 
such as that associated with the DSM aim at discovering natural kinds of mental disorder. A 
basic assumption of the DSM project is that discovering kinds of mental disorder will be 
important for grounding psychiatric theory. Furthermore, the procedures for revising the DSM 
assume that fixing the boundaries between kinds will be informed by empirical evidence. In 
seeking natural kinds of disorder, the DSM has tended to rely on tradition which is then 
revised as more and more empirical data is found. The sorts of evidence appealed to when 
the DSM is revised (rates of co-morbidity, family studies, drug response, differences in age 
of onset etc) can reasonably be hoped to enable us to map the causal structure of the 
domain of mental disorders. One might have concerns about the ways in which non-scientific 
factors might affect the process of DSM revision. Plausibly the classification has been 
affected by lobbying that is politically or financially motivated (Cooper 2005, Kutchins and 
Kirk 1997). Since the days of the DSM-III, however, the processes for revising the DSM have 
become less open to distortion. For example, committees are now expected to publish 
details of the literature on which they have based their decisions (in the DSM-IV 
Sourcebooks (Widiger, Frances and Pincus 1994,1996,1997), and online for the DSM-V) 
and those serving on the committees responsible for revisions are expected to limit their 
financial links with the pharmaceutical industry, (see e.g. guidelines of committee 
membership APA 2010). One might still worry that, in so far as the default position is that 
disorders remain between successive editions of the DSM, problematic categories inherited 
from DSM-III will remain. Still, the basic approach of the DSM-system to seeking natural 
kinds – start with a classification system and revise it as new evidence suggests – is a 
reasonable way to seek to achieve a classification of natural kinds, at least so long as one 
assumes that the traditional classification system from which the DSM has tried to progress 
via incremental stages is on roughly the right tracks. One worry is that if the initial 
classification was thoroughly misguided then the DSM process of revision, which allows 
revisions only when an advance over the existing classification can be proven, may not allow 
the classification system to ever reach an optimal state. Rather the classification could get 
stuck at a suboptimal point, in the same way in which evolving organisms can get stuck at 




Worries such as this lead those who do think that the starting point for the DSM is likely 
unsatisfactory to suggest full scale overhaul. Some theorists have suggested classifications 
based on some overarching theory– maybe, evolutionary theory (Murphy 2006) or 
developmental approaches. In so far as such classifications depend on the theoretical 
approach used to develop them they can only be expected to be as good as the theory 
behind them. Alternative approaches to classification involve the use of statistical methods to 
find kinds of disorder from raw data. On occasion, the proponents of “numerical taxonomy” 
have claimed that their approach is purely empirical and generates theory-free classification 
systems (e.g. Sokal and Sneath 1963). The claim that the techniques of numerical taxonomy 
are theory-free is misguided. Before the techniques of numerical taxonomy can be applied 
one must decide which properties will be entered into the analysis, and decide which of the 
various statistical techniques to apply. One’s theories will shape decisions at both these 
levels (Cooper, 2005, ch. 3). Still, though they are not theory-free, the techniques of 
numerical taxonomy offer one approach to seeking natural kinds of disorder.  
 
What if the categories developed by different classificatory approaches fail to correspond to 
each other? For example, what if a classification that is developed on the basis of treatment 
response fails to correspond to that developed by geneticists, which in turn fails to 
correspond to that used by those taking a developmental perspective?  We can note that 
such a situation also occurs in other sciences. Within biology, for example, Dupré has 
convincingly argued that the species concepts that are required in different areas of 
biological research fail to correspond to each other (Dupré 2001).  While ecologists find it 
most useful to classify species on the basis of current characteristics, evolutionary theorists 
find it better to classify on the basis of ancestry. Dupré suggests that in such a situation 
different scientific sub-disciplines should be free to classify as they find most useful. On 
Dupré’s metaphysical picture, the world is a complex place. Many categories can usefully be 
picked out for different scientific purposes, and so there are multiple sets of natural kinds 
that different subdisciplines might find it useful to classify. 
 
4. Which disorders aren’t natural kinds 
 
In this chapter we have come a long way from the traditional idea that natural kinds will be 
eternal, discrete, and possess essential properties. I have argued that a looser notion of 
natural kinds is sufficient to give us kinds that can do the important work of grounding 
inductions, explanations and predictions. We can say that natural kinds are groups of entities 
that are genuinely importantly similar to each other (and where, depending on one’s’ 
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account, theses similarities might be explained by the existence of homeostatic mechanisms 
or via copying).  If we take this approach, are there any kinds of mental disorder that will fail 
to be natural kinds?  
 
Finding natural kinds of mental disorder can still be expected to be difficult, and some 
current categories of mental disorder will fail to be natural kinds because they fail to group 
together cases that are similar to each other in any causally important respect. Most 
obviously, ragbag categories included in the DSM for completeness, such as Psychosis 
NOS, will fail to be natural kinds for this sort of reason. It may also turn out that some prima 
facia more respectable diagnoses fail to pick out natural kinds of disorder because they lump 
together heterogeneous cases. For example, if schizophrenia turns out to be an umbrella 
term for a number of conditions with differing underlying causal structures then 
schizophrenia would fail to be a natural kind. 
 
5. Implications of mental disorders being natural kinds 
 
If types of mental disorder are natural kinds, what are the implications? Occasionally, it is 
claimed that if types of people fall into kinds then there are ethical or political implications. In 
The Disorder of Things, Dupré claims that when types of people are considered to form 
distinct natural kinds “it is inevitable that any systematic differences that are found will be 
taken to be explained, or explicable, in terms of the intrinsic differences between members of 
the two kinds” (1993, p.253) This leads “to the legitimation of conservative politics and to the 
discouragement of proposals for significant social change” (1993, p256). Here, I think Dupré 
is simply mistaken. Take an example of human natural kinds – men and women - and 
consider some of the systematic differences between them. On average, women give birth to 
more children and are paid less than men. Here we have no problems recognising that some 
but not all of the differences are due to intrinsic differences, and that some but not all of the 
differences might be ameliorated by progressive social policies. Believing in human natural 
kinds is compatible with holding any range of political views. 
 
One implication that I think is important is that if types of mental disorder are natural kinds 
then this means that there may be grounds for optimism that one day successful therapies 
will be developed that will enable the mass treatment of disorders. If mental disorders are 
natural kinds, then this means that one case of a kind can be expected to behave like other 
cases of that kind. All cases of a kind will be alike in important respects. This means that a 
treatment that works for one of the kind can be expected to work for all. As a consequence, if 
mental disorders are natural kinds, then we can hope that “black-box” therapies may one 
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day be available. A black-box technology is one that a consumer can simply buy off-the-shelf 
(so named because they are typically sold in a black box) (Mackenzie 1993).  Black-box 
technologies may originally have been hard to develop, but have now been perfected so that 
they can be produced on an industrial scale, and delivered in a form that can be used 
reliably by people who don't understand how they work. Lasers offer an example. Originally 
getting lasers to work was very difficult, but now they can be bought off-the-shelf. Successful 
drug therapies would provide the most straightforward example of black-box therapies. 
Developing drugs is of course difficult. However once the right chemical has been found, 
drug treatments can ideally be refined to the stage where they can be produced on an 
industrial scale and taken with reliable effect by people with little understanding. Think of 
paracetamol, or the contraceptive pill.  
 
It will only be possible to develop black-box therapies for mental disorders if the disorders 
are natural kinds. The therapies can only be developed to work reliably in so far as the 
problems of those in the treatment group are all fundamentally similar. Note that although 
drug therapies offer the clearest promise of black-boxability, other forms of therapy might 
also be black-boxable. Suppose it turns out that depression can reliably be cured if a person 
plays football for half an hour a day, and spends an hour talking to others. Such a therapy 
would be black-boxable in my sense, as it is the sort of therapy that can be packaged such 
that it can be reliably reproduced by unskilled therapists (or reliably used for self-treatment). 
Ultimately the reason why it matters whether mental disorders are natural kinds is that if it is 
possible to classify mental disorders in such a way that cases that are importantly 
theoretically similar are classified together, then it may be possible to develop treatments 




In this chapter we have examined accounts of natural kinds, and asked whether types of 
mental disorder might be natural kinds and why it matters. We started by noting that different 
theorists define “natural kind” in different ways and are interested in different problems. One 
of the key claims of this chapter is that the variety of uses of the term “natural kind” means 
that it is important to be explicit exactly what one means when talking about natural kinds 
and to be clear what points are at issue. I have suggested that if we are interested in natural 
kinds in so far as they support explanations, inductions and predictions then the key 
question for the philosophy of psychiatry is whether it will be possible to classify mental 
disorders in a way that maps the causal structure of the domain of mental disorders. The aim 
is to classify cases together when they are similar to each other in causally important ways 
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and to classify them apart when there are no such similarities. Depending on the models of 
mental disorder that turn out to be correct, the similarities between cases of mental disorder 
that are important might be similarities with regard to neurotransmitter levels, or genetic 
abnormalities, or developmental history, or patterns of learnt responses, or whatever, or 
some combination of such similarities.   
 
We examined various objections to mental disorders being natural kinds (in this weak sense) 
and showed how they could be overcome. We argued that classifications that distinguish 
natural kinds of mental disorder might be created in a variety of ways. We saw that the 
implications of there being kinds of mental disorder are important and yet ethically and 
politically limited. If there are natural kinds of mental disorder then we can hope that a 
treatment that successfully treats one-of-a-kind might also treat others-of-that kind. 
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